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German Council on Foreign Relations
The Problem with 
Germany’s Masterful 
Crisis Presidency
A crisis can bring out the best in Ger-
many’s European policy, resulting in 
its selfless embrace of deeper inte-
gration. But sometimes crises require 
Germany to lead from the front rath-
er than melt selflessly into the back-
ground. On such occasions, Berlin has 
seemed a little too keen to stress that 
it is taking action under severe con-
straints. While Germany’s EU pres-
idency showcased both tendencies, 
its shift toward crisis-driven realism 
risks overshadowing its strides for a 
better Europe.
Germany took over the six-month 
presidency of the Council of the Euro-
pean Union on July 1, 2020. During its 
tenure, German officials have worked 
with almost superhuman resolve to 
prevent COVID-19 from becoming an 
unmanageable crisis. Last week, Ger-
many’s diplomats crowned their EU 
presidency by securing an agreement 
on the EU’s economic recovery. Eu-
rope’s multiannual budgetary talks are 
tricky enough at the best of times, but 
somehow Berlin turned the pandem-
ic into a transformative moment, se-
curing the EU’s power to raise money 
and transfer it between members. It 
was a startling success. And yet, there 
is a fly in the ointment. Crises like the 
COVID-19 pandemic seem almost to fill 
a vacuum in German European policy. 
Think back to the beginning of this 
year. In January, before the pandemic, 
members of the Bundestag expressed 
their concern to the German Europe 
minister that Berlin still had no clear 
strategy for its semester at the helm 
of the EU. How did Germany intend 
to set Europe up for the results of No-
vember’s US elections? What about 
the growing concerns over China? 
And when would Berlin give a proper 
reply to French President Emmanuel 
Macron and his agenda for the EU? 
The ministerial response – a legiti-
mate but convenient one – was that 
the government was waiting for the 
European Commission to reveal its 
own five-year strategy.
By March, with the f irst wave of 
COVID-19 breaking on Europe, every-
body was glad that Germany had kept 
its options open and refused to com-
mit resources to a long-term agen-
da. Now, Germany could use its spare 
capacities to resolve the unexpect-
ed challenge of the pandemic. Nev-
ertheless, the notion that calamity 
stalks the German government be-
came a running joke in other capitals. 
These days, it almost seems as if fate 
had rewarded Berlin with this Hercu-
lean task, providing a positive agenda 
to a presidency that otherwise lacked 
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ginning to sense that Germany enjoys 
an existential European crisis just a 
little too much.
THE NEW DEMANDS OF 
EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP
For decades, German governments 
have cheerfully slipped into a strait-
jacket, embracing the constraints the 
EU imposes. Germany’s commitment 
to fulfil the Treaty of Rome’s promise 
of an “ever closer union,” its historical 
responsibility toward eastern mem-
bers, and the need to keep the Franco- 
German motor running have all obliged 
it to be selfless. This German selfless-
ness has, in turn, frequently been in-
dispensable to the big bang moments 
of Europe’s integration. This held true 
in 2020, too. This year, Berlin sup-
pressed its own narrow interests to 
embrace the responsibilities of a cri-
sis presidency. With EU budget talks on 
the agenda, Berlin embraced the role 
of honest broker despite the fact that 
Germany pays the lion’s share.
But the current international environ-
ment often requires a different kind 
of Germany: one that leads from the 
front rather than melting selflessly in-
to the background. When the 2009 fi-
nancial crisis first obliged Berlin to 
play that new kind of leadership role 
– combining its interests, values, and 
long-term plans in a more overt and 
proactive way – Germany failed. Ever 
since that experience, German poli-
cymakers have been running scared 
from their own propensity to mor-
alize and overthink things. In today’s 
Berlin, a political culture has emerged 
that privileges doing over thinking and 
hard facts over abstract values. 
A crisis can thus be liberating for Ger-
many, providing an excuse for Berlin 
to shirk strategy and simply respond 
to facts. When big global shifts crys-
tallize into acute crisis moments, 
Berlin has grounds to switch into a 
very narrow kind of realism. But that 
means that it is just as easy for Ger-
many to cite the constraints of a cri-
sis presidency in order to put the 
focus on its narrow interests as it is 
to justify an exemplary abnegation of 
those interests. The generous EU bud-
get and the messy fudge of the rule of 
law mechanism are two sides of the 
same coin: Germany played up the 
constraints imposed by the crisis sit-
uation. In neither case did German 
policymakers move out of their com-
fort zone to define a strategic agenda.
DIAL-A-CRISIS
Other member st ates have not-
ed that Germany changes its be-
havior under crisis conditions, and 
they have tried to use that insight 
for their own purposes. The United 
Kingdom, for instance, felt it would 
benefit if Germany was given an ex-
cuse to assert its raw business in-
terests in the Brexit talks and so it 
tried to bring things to a head. In do-
ing so, however, the UK misread how 
closely German business interests 
are allied to the integrity of the sin-
gle market and how one-sided the cri-
sis resulting from a hard Brexit would 
be. Nevertheless, the UK’s tactics 
show a readiness to “help” Germany 
toward a narrow realism.
The British were not the only ones to 
try this kind of trick. Again and again 
during the past six months, other gov-
ernments manufactured crises in a 
bid to bounce Germany into action. 
France escalated tensions in the East-
ern Mediterranean, for example, while 
Cyprus held the EU hostage on the in-
troduction of sanctions against third 
countries. They too failed. Each time, 
Germany succeeded in quietly de-
fusing tensions. The mistake of these 
governments was, perhaps, trying to 
push Germany in a more geopolitical 
direction – to have it act upon (their 
reading of) Europe’s shared interests 
and values.
Then came the crisis over the Rule of 
Law Mechanism and the EU budget. 
Poland and Hungary understood Ger-
man interests well and provided Ber-
lin with an excuse to step back from 
its principled stand on this issue by 
threatening to block the budget and 
f low of money to crisis-hit southern 
Europe. In late November, I co-wrote 
a DGAP policy brief that argued that 
this political crisis was not as acute as 
it appeared and that southern Euro-
peans had other means to raise mon-
ey. Our assessment was that southern 
members – not least Portugal, which is 
next in line for the EU presidency and 
did not fancy taking on this fight with 
Poland and Hungary – were happy to 
inflate the sense of crisis.
Ours was a contentious argument, 
of course, but the reaction it elicited 
here in Berlin was interesting. When 
we made the case to Germans that the 
budget crisis was being inflated and 
that they had strategic opportunities 
to steer the outcome, they soon cited 
another set of overarching constraints 
to justify an immediate compromise. 
They told us that it was now the cli-
mate crisis that demanded realism: if 
Germany played hardball with Poland, 
Poland might lose access to the EU 
cash allotted to green transformation. 
(When the summit discussed climate 
targets, it might be added, Poland du-
ly rewarded Germany by taking these 
talks hostage too, excessively drawing 
out discussions when other pressing 
matters were on the table.)
JUDGING THE PRESIDENCY
So how will Germany’s presidency be 
judged? It is both a little naïve and 
churlish to see its presidency as any-
thing other than an overwhelming 
success – one achieved precisely by 
Germany’s readiness to put compro-
mise ahead of grandstanding. Also, the 
notion that Germany somehow invit-
ed the recurrent political crises that 
popped up during its semester will 
The Problem with Germany’s Masterful Crisis Presidency








The German Council on Foreign Relations 
(DGAP) is committed to fostering impactful 
foreign and security policy on a German and 
European level that promotes democracy, 
peace, and the rule of law. It is  nonpartisan 
and nonprofit. The opinions expressed in 
this publication are those of the author 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
the German Council on Foreign Relations 
(DGAP).
Publisher 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für  
Auswärtige Politik e.V.
ISSN 1864-347
Editing Helga Beck  
Layout Luise Rombach
Design Concept: WeDo
Author picture(s) © DGAP
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons 
 Attribution – NonCommercial – NoDerivatives 4.0 
 International License.
appear very odd to its diplomats on 
the front line. And there is something 
rather wearisome about the constant 
calls for German leadership when Ber-
lin shows this on a daily basis and oth-
er member states do not. 
Yet, unfair as it may be to point it out, 
there remains something of a vacu-
um at the heart of German European 
strategy – and filling it is where Ger-
many’s real obligation lies. To shirk 
this responsibility risks locking the 
EU into ever greater crises and ever 
smaller returns.
Moreover, there is a reason why the 
rule of law has become such a totem-
ic issue for the EU. The current debate 
reflects the rise of China and system 
competition and raises the question 
of what happens if people lose faith 
in the EU’s commitment to Europe-
an values. Academics, who for so long 
struggled to define “Euroskepticism,” 
now seem to agree that governments 
that reject the EU’s essential values – 
democracy and the rule of law – are 
Euroskeptic. But how long before vot-
ers demand their governments safe-
guard those essential values from the 
EU? How long before the Euroskeptics 
are the ones standing up for the rule 
of law? That is the day that the Euro-
pean Union is reduced to little more 
than a cash cow.
